The Euthyphro Dilemma (A-level Philosophy)
For over two mellenia, philosophers and theologians have grappled with a perplexing question regarding the nature of morality and its relationship to the divine. This question, known as the Euthyphro Dilemma, originates from Plato's dialogue Euthyphro, in which Socrates relentlessly challenges Euthyphro over the definition of piety (εὐσέβεια). At its core, the dilemma asks:
Is something good because the gods (or God) command it, or do the gods command it because it is already good?
In this blog, expert tutors at Humanitas Learning break down Plato's notorious dilemma, a crucial concept for A-level Philosophy students in the Metaphysics of God and Metaethics modules. Comprehending this problem helps us to critically assess the nature of God's omnipotence and its implications for whether moral truths are objective (moral realism) or simply a matter of divine will (anti-realism). We'll explore the problem using direct quotes from Plato's dialogue, then consider three responses from Christian theologians. The blog concludes by outlining the relevance of the dilemma to your exams.
Piety and Definition
To begin, let's dive into the dialogue itself to see how Socrates (Plato’s teacher who features as the central character in his dialogues) brings this dilemma to light.
The dialogue opens with Socrates meeting Euthyphro, who is on his way to prosecute his own father for murder. Euthyphro confidently asserts that his actions are pious, and he claims to have a perfect understanding of what piety (holiness) truly is. Socrates, ever the inquisitor, seizes this opportunity to learn from Euthyphro, asking him to define piety.
Euthyphro's initial attempts at definition fail, leading to the crucial moment when he offers: "What is dear to the gods is pious, and what is not dear to them is impious."
The Crux of the Dilemma
Socrates, with his characteristic relentless questioning, presses Euthyphro on this definition:
SOCRATES: "Consider this point: is the pious loved by the gods because it is pious, or is it pious because it is loved by the gods?"
EUTHYPHRO: "I do not understand what you mean, Socrates."
SOCRATES: "I will try to speak more clearly. We speak of a thing being carried and carrying, led and leading, seen and seeing, and you understand that these are all different, and how they differ?"
EUTHYPHRO: "Yes, I think I understand."
SOCRATES: "Then tell me, is a thing carried because it is being carried, or for some other reason? Is it seen because it is being seen, or for some other reason?"
EUTHYPHRO: "No, it is because it is being carried that it is carried; because it is being seen that it is seen."
SOCRATES: "Then what is pious is loved because it is pious, or it is pious because it is loved by the gods?"
EUTHYPHRO: "It is loved because it is pious."
And there it is! Euthyphro, perhaps unwittingly, chooses the first horn of the dilemma. If something is loved by the gods because it is pious, then piety (goodness) must exist independently of the gods' will. The gods merely recognise and approve of an already existing moral standard. This implies that morality has an external, objective basis, and the gods are themselves subject to it; this is a clear challenge to the omnipotence of the divine.
What if Euthyphro had chosen the other horn? If something is pious because it is loved by the gods, then morality becomes arbitrary. The gods could, theoretically, command anything – even grotesque cruelty or injustice – and it would, by definition, become good simply because they commanded it. This arguably makes morality capricious and removes any inherent value from actions themselves (moral anti-realism).
Socrates brilliantly exposes the flaw in Euthyphro's definition, demonstrating that Euthyphro doesn't actually understand the essence of piety, despite his zealous outlook. Much to the frustration of readers, the dialogue ends without a definitive answer to the definition of piety, but the dilemma itself remains a powerful tool for metaethical inquiry.
Why Does This Matter?
The Euthyphro Dilemma forces us to consider the foundation of morality and its relation to the divine:
If goodness is independent of God's will: It suggests a universal moral order that even God adheres to. This provides a stable and rational basis for ethics but might limit God's omnipotence.
If goodness is determined by God's will: It affirms God's absolute sovereignty but potentially at the cost of objective moral truth and consistency.
Grappling with this dilemma is essential for understanding the foundations of ethical systems, the nature of religious belief, and the ongoing debate about whether morality can exist meaningfully without a divine legislator. It is also a perceptive objection to most versions of Divine Command Theory as it challenges the idea that actions are only good by virtue of conformity to God’s will.
Theological Responses
Christian theologians have long been aware of the Euthyphro Dilemma and have offered various responses to navigate its implications. They generally seek to affirm God's sovereignty while maintaining the objective and consistent nature of morality, thus avoiding or rejecting the dilemma. Let’s look at three possible Christian responses:
God's Nature as the Source of Goodness (The Third Way): Many Christian theologians reject the premise of the dilemma, arguing that it presents a false dichotomy. They contend that goodness is not arbitrary and external to God, nor is it something God simply discovers. Instead, goodness is inherent in God's very nature and character. C.S. Lewis, for example, implicitly addresses this by suggesting that God is the definition of goodness. He doesn't have to be good; He is good. This view posits that God's commands are not arbitrary decrees but flow necessarily from His perfectly good, loving, just, and holy being. God commands what is good because He is good. His will is an expression of His immutable nature. Therefore, there's no independent standard above God, nor is morality arbitrary. What God commands is good because it is consistent with who God eternally is.
Divine Command Theory (Qualified): While some forms of Divine Command Theory might fall into the trap of arbitrariness, many Christian proponents qualify it significantly. They would argue that God's commands are indeed the ultimate source of moral obligation for humanity, but these commands are always consistent with God's perfect character. For these theologians, God's omnipotence includes the power to establish moral laws. However, His inherent goodness means He can only establish laws that are good. So, while something might be right because God commands it, He commands it because His nature dictates that it is the good and right thing to command. This approach emphasises God's authority while still ensuring moral stability.
God as the Ultimate Ground of Being and Value: Similar to argument 1, other Christian responses assert that God, as the creator of all existence, is also the ultimate ground of all value. Goodness is not something separate that God references; rather, it is an aspect of the created order that reflects God's own being. In this view, God doesn't just "have" goodness; He is the standard of goodness. When God creates, He instills goodness into His creation in a way that reflects His perfect nature. Therefore, human beings, made in God's image, have an innate moral sense (conscience) that resonates with God's commands because they are designed to operate according to the very goodness inherent in their creator. This idea is reflected in Aquinas’ Natural Law Theory, which maintains that moral notions are instilled innately in humans as “primary precepts”.
Conclusion
While Plato's Euthyphro Dilemma remains a powerful philosophical challenge, Christian theologians generally converge on the idea that God's nature itself is the ultimate and unchanging standard of goodness. God does not merely observe goodness, nor does He invent it arbitrarily; rather, He is goodness, and His commands are a perfect reflection of His divine character.
For A-level Philosophy students, the Euthyphro Dilemma is a cornerstone concept, frequently appearing in exam questions across the Ethics and Philosophy of Religion papers. It provides the central critique of Divine Command Theory, prompting discussions on whether moral truths are objective and universally binding (moral realism) or merely subjective expressions of will (moral anti-realism).
Additionally, the dilemma directly challenges the coherence of God's traditional attributes, particularly omnipotence and omnibenevolence, as students must analyse whether God can be both all-powerful and perfectly good if morality is either external to His will or arbitrarily defined by it. Engaging with this classic philosophical problem allows you to demonstrate critical thinking, construct rigorous arguments, and apply key concepts, all of which are fundamental for achieving top grades in your exams.
