Teleological Arguments (A-Level Philosophy)
Natural theology uses human reason and observation to argue for the existence of God, instead of relying on divine revelation. While Reformed theologians like John Calvin and Karl Barth are highly critical of this approach, it has a long history in Western (and Islamic) thought. Augustine of Hippo (354–430 AD) argued that the order and beauty of the natural world serve as a powerful testament to God as the creator. This tradition has been continued and refined by modern thinkers, including C.S. Lewis and Richard Swinburne.
One of the most enduring forms of natural theology are teleological arguments, which contend that the apparent design, purpose, and order of the universe and living organisms point to an intelligent creator. These are sometimes referred to as arguments from design. Unlike ontological arguments, which are a priori and try to prove God's existence through reason alone, teleological arguments are a posteriori because they rely on empirical observation. By observing the intricate complexity and fine-tuning of the cosmos, proponents of this argument argue that we can rationally infer the existence of an intelligent designer.
In this blog, expert tutors offer a comprehensive guide to teleological arguments, covering both the A-level syllabus and beyond. We begin by tracing the ancient origins of the argument before analysing William Paley's watchmaker analogy. The article then examines key critiques from David Hume and Charles Darwin, as well as a relevant counterargument. Finally, we assess Richard Swinburne's probabilistic argument and consider theological objections to the teleological approach as a whole. The article will also be of use to A-level Religious Studies students studying arguments for the existence of God.
Ancient Origins
A teleological argument is one that explains a thing by its purpose or final end, rather than by its cause or origin (like cosmological arguments). For example, a teleological explanation for why a fork has prongs is that its purpose (its telos) is to pierce food to make it easier to eat. The word "teleological" comes from two Greek roots:
Telos (τέλος), meaning "end," "purpose," "goal," or "aim."
Logos (λόγος), meaning "reason," "word," "study," or "discourse."
Unsurprisingly, then, the concept of a purposive universe originated with ancient Greek philosophers like Plato and Aristotle. They observed that nature exhibits order and regularity, inferring a "final cause" or telos (end/purpose) for all things. Plato believed the cosmos was the work of a divine "Demiurge" who brought order to a chaotic, pre-existing matter. This concept was later adapted by the Gnostics, who reinterpreted the Demiurge as an evil or ignorant lesser deity responsible for creating the flawed, material world.
Aristotle saw purpose as an intrinsic part of nature, arguing that everything, from an acorn to a human, has an inherent end toward which it strives. For him, the universe was set in motion by an "unmoved mover," a purely actual being that is the ultimate cause of all motion and change.
This Aristotelian concept was later integrated into Christian theology. Thomas Aquinas (c. 1225–1274) famously included a version of the teleological argument as the "Fifth Way" in his Summa Theologica. Aquinas argued that things in the natural world, which lack intelligence, act for an end. He used the analogy of an arrow being directed by an archer to argue that natural bodies are directed toward their goal by an intelligent being, which he called God.
Teleological arguments also hold a prominent place in Islamic thought, where they are often referred to as dalīl al-ināya (argument from providence) and dalīl al-ikhtirāʿ (argument from invention). Early Islamic theologians and philosophers, such as Al-Kindi, saw the intricate design and purposeful order of the universe as compelling evidence of an intelligent creator. The Quran itself encourages this line of reasoning, urging believers to reflect on the natural world as "signs" or āyāt of God's power and wisdom.
Paley's Watchmaker Analogy
For A-level Philosophy students, the first and most crucial version of the teleological argument to analyse is William Paley’s famous watchmaker analogy. A strong essay response to a 25-mark question on teleological arguments should begin with a critical assessment of this analogy before moving on to more sophisticated and modern versions, such as Richard Swinburne’s probabilistic argument. This approach allows you to demonstrate a clear grasp of both the historical development and the contemporary relevance of the design argument.
William Paley (1743–1805) was an influential English Anglican clergyman, theologian, and philosopher. Paley was a dedicated utilitarian and a staunch opponent of slavery, using his philosophical and religious arguments to advocate for political reform. He is most famous for his final work, Natural Theology (1802), which systematically laid out the argument from design and introduced the famous watchmaker analogy, a concept that would profoundly influence later scientific and philosophical thought, most notably that of a young Charles Darwin.
Paley's watchmaker analogy is a classic example of a teleological argument for the existence of God. Remember, an argument from analogy is a type of inductive argument in which a conclusion about one thing is reached based on its similarity to another. It argues that because two things are alike in several known ways, they are likely to be alike in another, unknown way. Paley’s argument is an example of this because he contends that the complexity and apparent purpose of the natural world points to an intelligent designer, much like the intricate design of a watch points to a watchmaker.
Paley begins by asking the reader to imagine walking across a heath and discovering a stone. He argues that one would assume the stone had always been there and would not inquire about its origin. However, if that same person were to find a watch on the ground, their conclusion would be different. Upon examining the watch, they would see that its various parts—gears, springs, and cogs—are intricately arranged and work together for a specific purpose: to tell time:
“In crossing a heath, suppose I pitched my foot against a stone, and were asked how the stone came to be there; I might possibly answer, that, for any thing I knew to the contrary, it had lain there for ever: nor would it perhaps be very easy to show the absurdity of this answer. But suppose I had found a watch upon the ground, and it should be inquired how the watch happened to be in that place; I should hardly think of the answer which I had before given, that, for any thing I knew, the watch might have always been there. Yet why should not this answer serve for the watch as well as for the stone? why is it not as admissible in the second case, as in the first? For this reason, and for no other, viz. that, when we come to inspect the watch, we perceive (what we could not discover in the stone) that its several parts are framed and put together for a purpose, e. g. that they are so formed and adjusted as to produce motion, and that motion so regulated as to point out the hour of the day; that, if the different parts had been differently shaped from what they are, of a different size from what they are, or placed after any other manner, or in any other order, than that in which they are placed, either no motion at all would have been carried on in the machine, or none which would have answered the use that is now served by it.”
(Natural Theology, Chapter 1)
Paley thus insists that the organised complexity of the watch could not have come about by chance. Even if the watch had the ability to reproduce itself, or if a single component was broken, it would not negate the fact that it was originally made by a skilled craftsman.
By analogy, Paley extends this reasoning to the natural world. He contends that the universe, and particularly living organisms, exhibit a far greater degree of complexity and purpose than any human-made object. The human eye, for example, is a testament to intricate design. Therefore, he concludes, just as the existence of a watch implies the existence of a watchmaker, the existence of the universe implies the existence of a grander, far more intelligent designer—God.
Hume's Objections to Design Arguments
Before Paley published his famous teleological argument, the Scottish philosopher David Hume (1711–1776) had already launched a formidable critique of design arguments in his Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion (published posthumously in 1779). His arguments, presented through the character of Philo, remain incredibly influential and are foundational for challenging teleological arguments like Paley’s.
1. The Problem with Analogy
Hume's primary objection to the design argument is that the analogy between human artifacts and the universe is flawed. He argues that we cannot logically infer a creator for the universe simply because we observe a designer for objects like watches or houses. Hume points out several problems with this analogy:
The Analogy is Weak: We have extensive experience with the creation of houses and watches, but we have no experience with the creation of universes. Hume's character Philo questions how we can compare two things so fundamentally different. We have no basis for inferring a cause for the universe, as it is a unique entity outside of our experience.
The Universe's Uniqueness: Since the universe is a singular, unique case, we cannot apply our normal rules of causal inference. Our understanding of cause and effect comes from observing repeated instances, but with the universe, there is only one instance.
The Analogy is Flawed: The universe may not even be a machine at all. Hume suggests it might be more like a vegetable or an animal, which grows and develops naturally from internal principles rather than being constructed by an external agent. This alternative analogy anticipates evolutionary explanations for order in the natural world.
2. The Problem of Imperfection
Hume argues that if we take the analogy seriously, the perceived flaws in the universe—such as natural disasters, human and animal suffering, and inefficient systems—must be attributed to the designer. He questions whether such a universe could be the work of a perfect being. In fact, the presence of what appears to be "spatial disorder" and suffering might suggest a designer who is less than perfect. As Hume's Philo puts it, "This world, for aught he knows, is very faulty and imperfect, compared to a superior standard; and was only the first rude essay of some infant deity, who afterwards abandoned it, ashamed of his lame performance." This objection suggests the designer might be incompetent, malicious, or perhaps even a committee of lesser deities- a position once held by certain Gnostics.
3. Causation and "Constant Conjunction"
Hume fundamentally challenged the very basis of inferring a cause for the universe. He argued that our understanding of causation is not based on a logical necessity but on our repeated observation of two events occurring together. This is what he called "constant conjunction." For example, we know that a thrown ball will break a window because we have observed this sequence of events countless times. However, we have no such experience with the creation of universes. As Hume's character Philo states, “The works of nature are a single fact.” Since we have only one universe to observe, we cannot apply our normal rules of causal inference. Therefore, we have no rational basis to conclude that it was caused by a cosmic designer in the same way we know a watch was caused by a watchmaker.
4. Infinite Time, Finite Matter
Hume also speculated on the possibility of order arising from chance, a point that anticipates later scientific theories. He argued that if a finite amount of matter were to exist for an infinite amount of time, it would eventually, through random motion and rearrangement, pass through every possible configuration. This means that a seemingly ordered and purposeful universe could arise purely by chance, without the need for an intelligent designer. The current state of order we observe might simply be a temporary, random phase in an eternal, chaotic cycle. This objection provides a powerful, naturalistic alternative to the design hypothesis. This, we shall see, is also a potential objection to Swinburne’s probabilistic teleological argument.
Darwin's Alternative: Evolution by Natural Selection
The most significant scientific challenge to teleological arguments came from Charles Darwin's (1809–1882) theory of evolution by natural selection, published in his groundbreaking 1859 work, On the Origin of Species. Darwin demonstrated how complex, seemingly designed biological structures could arise through a purely natural and undirected process, rather than from an intelligent designer.
He outlined a simple yet profound mechanism:
Variation: Within a species, individuals naturally exhibit a wide range of variations.
Inheritance: These variations can be passed down from parents to offspring.
Selection: In the struggle for existence, individuals with traits that are advantageous for survival and reproduction are more likely to pass on those traits. Darwin famously stated, "I am convinced that natural selection has been the main but not exclusive means of modification."
Time: Over immense periods, these small, advantageous changes accumulate, leading to the development of incredibly complex and well-adapted organisms.
Darwin's theory offers a powerful alternative to a divine watchmaker, explaining apparent design as the product of a blind, mechanical process. The "designer," in this view, is simply the undirected mechanism of natural selection, operating on random variations over millions of years. For example, the human eye, which William Paley saw as a prime example of divine design, can be explained through a series of incremental steps. Over time, a simple light-sensitive patch of cells on an early organism's skin could have developed into a cupped shape, which would have offered better directional information. Further small variations, such as the formation of a pinhole or a lens, would have provided a survival advantage, allowing the organism to better detect predators or prey. Each of these tiny, advantageous changes would have been "selected" and passed on, eventually culminating in the sophisticated complexity of the modern eye.
Counterargument: Intelligent Design and the Complexity of Cells
Even in the face of Darwinian evolution, the design argument has adapted. Some contemporary biologists and philosophers, often associated with the Intelligent Design (ID) movement, argue that the complexity observed at the cellular and molecular level goes beyond what Darwinian evolution can explain.
Figures like Michael Behe propose the concept of "irreducible complexity." He argues that certain biological systems, such as the bacterial flagellum or the blood clotting cascade, are composed of multiple interacting parts. The removal of even one part renders the entire system non-functional. For example, the bacterial flagellum, a tail-like motor that allows bacteria to move, is composed of dozens of complex proteins. Behe argues that since each of these proteins is essential for the function of the flagellum, it could not have evolved gradually through natural selection, as there would be no selective advantage for intermediate, non-functional forms. Therefore, he concludes they must have been "intelligently designed."
Another key figure in the ID movement is William Dembski, who argues for "specified complexity." He contends that certain biological features are too complex and specific to have arisen by chance or natural law. Dembski proposes that a feature, like the information encoded in DNA, exhibits specified complexity if it is both complex (improbable) and specified (follows a specific pattern). He argues that only an intelligent agent can produce specified complexity, concluding that life must have had an intelligent designer. These arguments bring the design argument down to a microscopic level, moving the focus from the large-scale biological structures of Paley's time to the intricate workings of the cell.
Swinburne's Probabilistic Teleological Argument
Richard Swinburne (b. 1934), a contemporary philosopher, offers a sophisticated inductive (probabilistic) teleological argument, distinct from Paley's approach. Swinburne focuses on the regularities of succession (the laws of nature) rather than just spatial order (like Paley's watch).
Swinburne argues that the universe exhibits two types of order:
Spatial Order (Regularities of Co-presence): The arrangement of parts in a whole (Paley's watch analogy).
Temporal Order (Regularities of Succession): The consistent and predictable laws of nature (e.g., gravity, electromagnetism).
Swinburne concedes that Darwin’s theory of evolution might explain spatial order in living things. However, he contends that evolution itself relies on the fundamental, unchanging laws of nature. Why is the universe governed by such simple, elegant, and stable laws that allow for the formation of stars, planets, and life? As Swinburne puts it:
"The orderliness of the laws of nature suggests the existence of a God... The laws of nature are regularities of succession, and the regularities of succession are the best evidence of design... The hypothesis that there is a God is the simplest hypothesis which can explain the general regularities of the natural world."
Swinburne uses an analogy of probability: Imagine a pack of cards always dealing out in perfect order (A, 2, 3... K of hearts, then diamonds, etc.). While possible by chance, it's far more probable that someone arranged the deck. Similarly, while a universe with stable laws could arise by chance, it's far more probable, given its orderliness, that an intelligent being designed those laws.
Swinburne thus highlights the fine-tuning of the universe. Arguments from fine-tuning start by observing the fundamental features of the universe that allow for the existence of complex life. Proponents then conduct thought experiments to consider what the universe would be like if these features were different. These arguments contend that the universe is precisely suited for the development of complex life. As Swinburne notes, “not all initial conditions or laws of nature would lead to, or even permit, the existence of human bodies.” He further clarifies the concept of fine-tuning by stating, “If only a very narrow range of laws and initial conditions allow such an evolution, then we may say that the universe is ‘fine-tuned’ for this evolution.”
Even slight variations in fundamental physical constants (e.g., the strength of gravity) would have made life impossible. This "anthropic principle" is, for Swinburne, strong evidence for a cosmic designer, which Swinburne identifies with the God revealed in the Bible.
Objections to Swinburne:
The Multiple Universes Hypothesis: If there are an infinite or vast number of universes (a "multiverse"), each with different physical laws, then it's statistically inevitable that some universe would have the conditions necessary for life. We just happen to be in that one. This reduces the apparent "improbability" of our universe, similar to winning a lottery if you buy every possible ticket. Swinburne might counter that the multiverse itself still requires an explanation for its existence or its "universe-generating mechanism."
Is the Designer God? As Hume observes, even if we accept that there is a designer, does this designer have to be the omnipotent, omniscient, omnibenevolent God of classical theology? Hume's objections resurface here:
Perhaps the universe was designed by a committee of gods.
Perhaps it was the work of a beginner god, or an old, retired god.
Perhaps the designer is finite or limited in power, explaining the imperfections.
We cannot infer the perfect God from an imperfect universe.
Theological Objections (A-level Religious Studies)
Surprisingly, however, it's not just atheists or philosophers who have taken issue with teleological arguments. Some theologians, particularly in the Reformed Protestant tradition, express strong reservations, arguing that such an approach limits God’s transcendent nature and fundamentally misunderstands how we should come to know Him.
1. John Calvin (16th Century Reformer):
Calvin, while believing in God as Creator and seeing evidence of God's glory in nature (what he called the "spectacles" of God's works), was deeply skeptical of natural theology's ability to lead to true knowledge of God. He argued that humanity's fallen nature (due to sin) means our reason is utterly corrupted. This is referred to as Total Depravity. While we can see design, our sinful minds will distort this perception, leading us to false conclusions or preventing us from truly acknowledging the personal God of the Bible. For Calvin, true knowledge of God comes only through divine revelation, specifically through the Bible and the person of Jesus Christ, not through human reason contemplating nature. Natural arguments, at best, can show us there's a creator, but not the specific God who offers salvation.
2. Karl Barth (20th Century Theologian):
Barth, a hugely influential neo-orthodox theologian from the Reformed tradition, was a fierce opponent of natural theology. He believed that any attempt to prove God's existence through reason or observation (including teleological arguments) is fundamentally flawed and dangerously misleading. For Barth, God is "Wholly Other" and transcendent; he can only be known because God chooses to reveal Himself to humanity. This is known as God’s Grace. Human reason, on its own, is insufficient and will always create a God in its own image, rather than encountering the true, living God. He feared that relying on arguments like the teleological argument turned God into an object of human inquiry, a conclusion of philosophy, rather than a living, sovereign being to be worshipped and encountered through faith. Such arguments, for Barth, detract from the centrality of Jesus Christ as the sole means of revelation.
These theological objections highlight a different concern: not whether the argument is logically sound or scientifically plausible, but whether it is theologically appropriate or sufficient for encountering the God of faith.
Conclusion: Application to A-level Philosophy Exams
The teleological argument, from William Paley's intuitive watch analogy to Richard Swinburne's sophisticated probabilistic reasoning, continues to spark philosophical debate. While Charles Darwin's theory of evolution provided a powerful alternative explanation for biological complexity, new arguments focusing on cosmic fine-tuning and irreducible complexity keep the discussion alive. However, the Humean critiques, particularly concerning the limits of analogy and the nature of the inferred designer, remain significant hurdles for any design argument, as do the theological challenges of Kar Barth.
For the AQA Philosophy exam, it's crucial to structure your essays logically to showcase your critical understanding. A strong approach for a 25-mark question should begin by assessing a weaker version of the teleological argument (Paley’s analogy) and move toward more sophisticated arguments such as the ID movement and Swinburne’s fine-tuning argument. Remember to apply the principle of charity and outline each argument clearly and judiciously, referencing key thinkers and using philosophical terminology.
Here is a potential plan for the 25 mark question: “Can teleological arguments successfully prove the existence of God?:
Introduction: Signpost your thesis and introduce key terms.
Begin by outlining Paley's watchmaker analogy and the Humean critiques that challenge it, such as the weakness of analogy and the problem of a flawed or limited designer.
Next, introduce Darwin's theory of evolution as a powerful, non-teleological alternative for explaining biological complexity.
Then, transition to Swinburne's probabilistic version of the argument. Explain how it moves beyond biological examples and focuses on the fine-tuning of the universe's fundamental laws, which is compatible with Darwinian evolution.
Finish by critically assessing the final challenges to Swinburne's argument. Consider objections like the multiverse hypothesis and the enduring Humean problem of inferring a specific kind of designer (e.g., an omnipotent, omnibenevolent God) from the observed evidence.
Offer a concise conclusion which recaps your main argument and clearly addresses the exact wording of the question.
Good luck and get in touch for further tips and personalised support!
